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MODELS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: 
CENTRAL PLANNING VERSUS MARKET-BASED 
APPROACHES 
Richard B. Stewart* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today the Soviet Union and other nations that have employed 
state socialist economies are moving toward market economies. The 
deficiencies of central planning and the advantages that a market 
economy provides in decentralized decisionmaking and flexible in-
centives are the primary factors motivating this transition. As these 
nations develop their environmental protection institutions, they 
should look to market mechanisms to protect the environment. The 
United States, despite its market-based economy, has relied heavily 
on central planning-style, "command-and-control" tools to achieve 
its environmental protection goals. As the high cost and limited 
effectiveness of these tools has become more evident, the United 
States has begun shifting to the use of market-based incentives in 
its environmental policies. The Soviet Union can learn from the 
United States's experience and adopt its own market-based environ-
mental protection strategies. 
An individual planning to use a resource must take into account 
the costs that it will have to pay to acquire or use the resource. The 
individual usually does not pay attention, however, to the impacts 
that its use of the resource will have on others, because these impacts 
are not incorporated into the market price incentives or other in-
ducements-such as centrally planned production quotas-that gov-
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ern its decision. These impacts are a kind of "externality": a cost 
that is "external" to the resource user's decisionmaking calculus. A 
typical example is environmental degradation. Polluters generally 
can use the air or water as a dumping ground for free, and people 
other than the polluter bear most of the costs of degraded air or 
water quality. Because the polluter is not confronted with the need 
to pay for this degradation, he or she produces more degradation 
than society as a whole desires. 
Several legal and policy tools are available to address this problem 
of externalities. Under technology-based command-and-control reg-
ulation, the government instructs each resource user on exactly how 
to operate its activities-for example, what pollution-control tech-
nology it should install or even how much it should operate a busi-
ness. Command-and-control "performance standards" require re-
source users to achieve a given, uniform level of environmental 
performance but allow them some flexibility in choosing the specific 
technology to achieve that performance. "Market-based" mecha-
nisms impose a tax or an equivalent price incentive on the pollution 
or other negative externalities that a resource user creates. This 
type of mechanism gives polluters incentives to reduce pollution, so 
that government-specified aggregate pollution limits are achieved, 
but allows each individual polluter flexibility in deciding how much 
to clean up and what methods to use. Other tools include environ-
mental impact analyses (EIAs), which require decisionmakers to 
assess and consider the environmental impacts of proposed actions; 
and information disclosure rules, which require a resource user to 
publish for the public materials regarding the nature of its activities. 
This Article discusses each of these tools below. 
II. EXTERNALITIES IN GOVERNMENT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
When government agencies decide on resource uses, they usually 
do not consider the full social costs and benefits of their actions. The 
decisionmakers are officials in specialized bureaucracies with partic-
ular missions, and they typically do not pay attention to the envi-
ronmental impacts of their decisions on others outside their mission 
area. Government-run military factories, for example, typically have 
manufactured weapons without adequately addressing the environ-
mental pollution that their activities cause. Another example is gov-
ernment-run electricity-generating plants, which often produce elec-
tricity through high-pollution processes and sell it for less than the 
full cost (including environmental costs) of producing it. Such prac-
tices have caused serious environmental damage. In fact, environ-
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mental degradation from government-run facilities is a common 
problem in both the Soviet Union and the United States. In the 
United States, this problem has plagued management of the national 
forests, federal water and dam projects, and military weapons plants 
and facilities. In the Soviet Union, where government agencies have 
run a much larger part of all economic activity, heavy pollution and 
degradation characterize almost every industry, sometimes in crisis 
proportions. 
At the same time that it is causing environmental harm, the 
federal government is responsible for protecting public health and 
the environment from injury. This raises the question of how the 
government can effectively "regulate itself." In theory it could im-
pose environmental restrictions on its own activities and have one 
agency, such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), enforce those rules against other agencies through adminis-
trative procedures. In practice this mechanism has not entirely suc-
ceeded, in part because environmental enforcement authority is 
weak when it challenges other high-priority government policies. 
Instead, the United States has ended up relying on two other en-
forcement mechanisms. First, the federal government imposes en-
vironmental restrictions on agencies and then allows state govern-
ments to bring enforcement actions in court against those agencies. 
In addition, it permits citizens to bring such enforcement action. 
The United States's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
imposes another important obligation on federal agencies-they 
must perform an environmental impact statement (EIS) before un-
dertaking any major action. The EIS must include an assessment of 
both the environmental impacts of the proposed project and the 
reasonable alternative courses of action. An agency thereby is forced 
to think about the effects of its proposed action beyond its narrow 
mission area: to consider the externalities that it may impose. Under 
NEPA, citizens can sue a federal agency that fails to conduct an 
adequate EIS, and obtain an injunction to block the proposed agency 
action until the EIS is revised to the court's satisfaction. The NEPA 
process also exposes to public scrutiny the adverse environmental 
impacts of a project. Public pressure often can induce a federal 
agency to find less damaging ways of achieving this mission. 
III. EXTERNALITIES IN MARKET ECONOMIES 
A. Market Failure 
Private market decisionmakers also often ignore the social and 
environmental impacts of their actions. Many markets provide in-
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centives to producers of goods and services to satisfy consumers' 
desires, but fail to incorporate in the prices of producers' production 
inputs and commodity outputs the environmental costs that the pol-
luter, as well as other negative effects of resource use, impose on 
society at large. This is the familiar concept of "market failure." 
One example of a market externality is water pollution arising 
from a factory's industrial operations. This pollution imposes a cost 
on the neighbors of the factory, such as the local fishers who lose 
their livelihood when fish die, or the local residents whose health is 
impaired. That cost, however, is not included in the price that the 
factory pays for its raw materials or that consumers pay for its 
products. As a result, the factory has no incentive to reduce pollu-
tion. If companies had to pay for the costs of pollution, and if they 
included these costs in the price of their products, consumers would 
have to pay more for the products of companies that polluted more, 
and cleaner companies would sell more products. 
Where market failures are serious, government intervention to 
correct such failures is often justified. 1 The decision to intervene, 
however, is not the end of the story. There are different mechanisms 
for correcting market failures. The selection among them is critical. 
B. Traditional Regulatory Responses 
Over the last twenty years in the United States, the main model 
for the design of regulation has been the technology-based command-
and-control standard. In some cases the central government specifies 
the precise technologies or designs that industry must install. In 
other cases, it expresses central standards in performance terms, 
for example, requiring all polluters in a given category to limit 
emissions to a specific percentage or amount. In theory, polluters 
have flexibility to meet such standards through a variety of tech-
niques. In practice, however, regulators typically base such stan-
dards on the use of a specific technology, and polluters face strong 
administrative incentives to use that technology in order to demon-
strate compliance. 
Many United States laws regulating pollution and hazardous 
waste, including the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Clean Air Act 
1 While market failure is a necessary condition for government intervention, it is not 
sufficient. There also can be "government failure": policies can fail to achieve their intended 
results or even be counterproductive. Intervention is warranted where its benefits exceed its 
costs. 
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(CAA), embody command-and-control measures. This approach has 
produced uniform, inflexible standards that result in high compliance 
costs, restrict innovation, discourage efficient use of resources, and 
require detailed central planning of economic activity. While some 
of these regulatory controls have been initially effective in limiting 
environmental degradation, they also have proved to be costly and 
less effective over the longer term. 
The command-and-control approach often is implemented through 
regulations requiring "best available control technology" (BACT) or 
a level of performance based on BACT. The government uses these 
technology-based standards because they give the impression of ac-
complishing results-after all, what could be better than "best?" 
Moreover, imposition of technology controls ensures reduction of 
pollution out of the "end of the pipe." 
The United States's experience, however, has shown that the 
BACT approach has several important drawbacks. First, a technol-
ogy-based approach is insensitive to the costs and benefits of apply-
ing each control technology at each site. It requires the same type 
of control at each site, even if some other means of reducing pollution 
at that site would be cheaper or environmentally preferable. Second, 
technology standards discourage innovation in control technologies. 
When the government designates a technology as "best" and man-
dates it adoption, that technology is "locked in," capturing the mar-
ket and discouraging the development of innovations that could im-
prove performance. For example, if the government designates one 
type of flue gas desulfurization technology as BACT and requires 
that all firms install it, other techniques for sulfur removal have no 
economic value, because they are excluded from the market. Over 
time, this barrier to innovation seriously impairs the ability of tech-
nology-based standards to protect the environment. 
Third, a technology standard discourages improvements in con-
servation: raw material choices and efficiency improvements that 
would reduce the production of pollutants requiring treatment or 
disposal. Requiring the adoption of specific control technologies gives 
businesses no incentive to conserve fuels or otherwise minimize 
emissions once the control technology is in place. Pollution preven-
tion activities, such as redesigning production processes or changing 
raw materials inputs to reduce the total quantity of pollution pro-
duced, often can be more effective than capping or treating what 
comes out of the discharge pipe. Further, end-of-the-pipe controls 
tend to address each kind of pollution separately, or "piecemeal," 
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simply moving pollutants from one environmental medium-whether 
air, land, or water-to another instead of addressing the total quan-
tity of all pollutants discharged into all media. 
Fourth, the BACT approach often results in far more stringent 
controls on new plants than existing plants. While some differential 
is justified given the fact that the costs of retrofitting old plants are 
higher than the costs of building controls into new plants, the im-
plementation of BACT in the United States often has unduly hind-
ered the construction of new plants, discouraging the capital invest-
ment and innovation that are necessary to promote economic growth. 
Because newer plants are typically cleaner plants, this discourages 
environmental improvement as well. 
Fifth, a technology-based approach requires a large centralized 
government bureaucracy to study industries and choose technolo-
gies. Decisions are slow, unresponsive, and costly. Because of the 
problems in gathering and processing information in a control bu-
reaucracy, the standards produced are often inappropriate to local 
circumstances or obsolescent. 
C. Market-Based Regulatory Responses 
Recently, United States environmental policy increasingly has em-
ployed market-based incentives. Because the underlying problem is 
that private markets are operating imperfectly, the better approach 
for government action often will be to "reconstitute" the market. 
Rather than overriding the market with central planning, the gov-
ernment reorients the market by providing incentives that promote 
environmental protection. Revising the market's system of pricing 
or consumer demand to include environmental considerations can 
turn the indefatigable creativity of diverse and flexible responses by 
market actors to environmental advantage. It reduces overall social 
costs because those who can prevent degradation most cheaply are 
encouraged to do so most. Finally, it advances environmental pro-
tection as the incentives spur innovation in environmentally benign 
technologies and processes, and as efficient use of resources, such 
as conservation of fuels, is put on equal footing with installation of 
control technology. 
The government can attach a tax or a fee to each unit of emissions, 
effectively forcing emitters to internalize the costs that pollution 
imposes on society. The theory is that each emitter will reduce its 
emissions to the point that its costs of control become as expensive 
as paying the tax or fee. This point will vary for each emitter, but 
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the aggregate emissions reduction will correspond to the level of the 
tax or fee exacted. 
Under the concept of tradeable allowances, the government im-
poses a limit on the total quantity of emissions, issues allowances 
adding up to that total, and then allows emitters to buy and sell 
allowances among each other. Each emitter must hold an allowance 
for each unit of its actual emissions or face heavy penalties. The 
aggregate emissions cannot exceed the total level that the govern-
ment has set, but the amount for which any individual firm is re-
sponsible will vary. Those who can control emissions more cheaply 
will do so and sell their excess allowances at a profit, while those for 
whom control is more expensive will purchase allowances. The mar-
ket price of the allowances operates like a fee on emissions, forcing 
purchasers to internalize the costs of their emissions. 
A deposit-refund system is like a fee with a rebate. For example, 
those who generate a hazardous waste must pay a fee to the gov-
ernment for each unit of waste generated; when they properly treat 
and dispose of the waste, they receive a refund. This arrangement 
provides incentives to reduce waste output and to treat and properly 
dispose of those wastes that are generated. Illegal dumping of un-
treated wastes would equal a forfeit of the deposit and is therefore 
not profitable. 
Information disclosure policies require companies to report to the 
public about the environmental characteristics of their products and 
services, the substances they keep on their premises, and their 
discharges into the environment. Consumers who care about the 
environment will switch their purchases to firms that produce en-
vironmentally sound products and services, giving such firms a com-
petitive advantage over their dirtier rivals. In addition, public in-
formation about pollution and its hazards can create informal public 
pressure on firms to reduce these hazards. 
In general, market-based instruments address each of the five 
drawbacks to command-and-control policies. First, market-based 
mechanisms make effective use of the variation in costs of control to 
minimize overall costs. Under a market-based incentive approach, 
each source gets the flexibility and the financial incentive to reduce 
pollution and other forms of environmental degradation in the chea-
pest and most effective way. As a result, polluters can achieve a 
given level of overall environmental protection at a far lower cost 
than under rigid, uniform command-and-control standards. In gen-
eral, the cost savings of market-based approaches already tried in 
the United States have been quite significant, ranging up to fifty 
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percent or more as compared to command-and-control policies. For 
an economy like that of the Soviet Union, striving to protect its 
environment with very limited financial resources, this kind of cost 
saving can be absolutely essential. Second, market-based mecha-
nisms spur creativity and innovation. Under a market-based incen-
tive approach, rather than simply being told by the government 
what technology to install, firms have a strong economic and com-
petitive incentive, as well as the necessary flexibility, to develop 
better, cheaper, and more powerful pollution reduction techniques. 
Third, market-based incentives encourage conservation and effi-
cient use of resources. Because each firm is free to choose its least 
cost response in order to reduce overall pollution, it need not only 
install end-of-the-pipe control devices. The firm also can find new 
and better ways of producing its products: methods and processes 
that use less materials and hence result in less pollution. For ex-
ample, instead of installing a smokestack pollution-removal device, 
the firm may decide to use fuel more efficiently, reducing both pol-
lution and energy resource use. In addition, market-based incentives 
avoid the problem of piecemeal measures that rely on end-of-the-
pipe controls. Market-based approaches can be more readily de-
signed to set incentives to reduce the total quantity of pollution, 
rather than to control one kind of pipe at a time and only move 
pollution from one form to another. 
Fourth, the regulatory bias against new facilities disappears be-
cause both old and new sources must pay the same tax or face the 
same price for allowances. Fifth, a market-based approach reduces 
the need for a large centralized bureaucracy. An important role for 
the government remains: to set taxes or pollution allowances; mon-
itor performance, such as emissions; and ensure, through vigorous 
enforcement, that firms are not exceeding their allowances or evad-
ing the payment of required fees. No longer, however, is a huge 
staff of engineers and technicians in the central government needed 
to determine what quantity of emissions each of hundreds of thou-
sands of plants should control and to select specific technological 
controls. That responsibility devolves to private managers, who have 
up-to-date, detailed information about local conditions and opportu-
nities. 
Market-based approaches, however, will not be suitable for solving 
every environmental problem. For example, market-based policies 
usually tie incentives to a quantitative measure of environmental 
performance, such as the quantity of emissions, so they require 
information about emissions or discharges. Where such information 
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is very hard to obtain, a technology-based approach may be neces-
sary, at least in the short run. It is also possible to combine economic 
incentives and traditional forms of regulation. For example, regu-
lations can require a base level of control by all plants in a given 
industrial grouping, while taxes on emissions above the base level 
can provide flexible, cost-effective incentives for additional reduc-
tions. 
D. Market-Based Approaches in Action 
1. Examples of Current Programs 
a. The Lead Phase-down 
Lead is a toxic substance, linked to brain damage in people who 
eat or inhale it. In 1982, under the CAA, the EPA issued regulations 
reducing the allowable lead content of gasoline. The agency simul-
taneously authorized trading, within and among refiners, of the re-
maining allowed content of lead in their gasoline. Leaded gasoline 
producers and importers could transfer, that is, buy and sell, lead 
content credits freely among themselves, but their credits expired 
quarterly if unused. In 1985, the EPA further lowered the lead 
content limits. To provide leaded gasoline producers and importers 
with additional flexibility in complying with the new limits, the 
agency issued regulations permitting producers and importers whose 
gasoline in 1985 contained less lead per gallon than the applicable 
standard to "bank" lead content credits: to avoid the expiration of 
their credits. The "banking" regulations then permitted these pro-
ducers and importers to "withdraw" their lead content credits 
through the end of 1987 and to apply them to help meet the new, 
more stringent lead content standards that took effect in 1985. 
Banking and trading were active and resulted in cost savings on 
the order of hundreds of millions of dollars over the few years of the 
program. Firms were not required to apply to the EPA for permis-
sion to enter into trades; they simply reported their trades to the 
government as part of their regularly required reports of the lead 
content in their gasoline. The program successfully reduced the lead 
content in gasoline by ninety percent. 
b. Chlorofluorocarbon Reduction 
Both trading and taxes are now tools in the effort to phase out 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in order to protect the stratospheric 
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ozone layer. To implement the 1987 Montreal Protocol (and its 1990 
update, the London Adjustments and Amendments) and the national 
legislation following from it, the EPA has issued regulations requir-
ing a phase-out of CFC production and consumption by the year 
2000 and implementing the phase-out by issuing depreciating allow-
ances to each producer and importer of CFCs. CFC producers, 
importers, and other interested parties may trade these allowances. 
The EPA is able to monitor production and imports of CFCs and to 
keep track of allowance trades. Producers are aware of potential 
buyers and sellers and can trade allowances freely. 
In addition to issuing CFC allowances, the United States has 
imposed a tax on CFC production and importation. Like the allow-
ance trading system, by increasing CFC prices, this tax provides a 
market for the development and use of substitutes for CFCs. 
c. The Pine lands Development 
The state of New Jersey successfully has used a somewhat differ-
ent allowance approach to regulate development of the Pinelands, a 
forest zone that the state wishes to protect from excessive devel-
opment. Here the allowances are not for emissions but for rights to 
develop property. Property in parts of the Pinelands is slated for 
preservation, and the owners of that property may agree to be 
prohibited from developing their land. In return, the state would 
issue them "transferable development rights" (TDRs) that they may 
sell to others wishing to develop land in other areas of the Pinelands. 
Each owner would receive different amounts of TDRs depending on 
the value to society of preserving that owner's property. In areas in 
which development is permitted, landowners must hold TDRs to 
develop their property. Thus, the total amount of development in 
the Pinelands is capped, and the regional distribution is partly re-
stricted, but the precise allocation of development on permissible 
properties is left to the market for TDRs. In addition, no current 
land owner is entirely deprived of the former market value of his or 
her land, because those whom the state bars from developing their 
own land receive TDRs to sell to others. The government has estab-
lished a TDR exchange to facilitate trades-the exchange buys TDRs 
from willing sellers and sells them to interested buyers. 
2. An Example of a Program Nearing Implementation: The Bush 
Administration Plan to Reduce Acid Precipitation 
The Bush Administration proposed, and in 1990 Congress passed, 
new CAA legislation to reduce emissions of materials that contribute 
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to acid precipitation, or "acid rain." A key feature of the Adminis-
tration Plan is the use of transferable emission allowances. The law 
requires a roughly fifty-percent permanent reduction, within ten 
years, in the total emission of sulfur dioxide-one of the main pre-
cursors of acid precipitation-from fossil fuel-burning electric gen-
erating plants, which are the primary source of sulfur dioxide emis-
sions in the United States. 
Each plant will receive emission allowances based on its historic 
energy capacity. The government will reduce these allowances grad-
ually each year in order to achieve the fifty-percent reduction after 
ten years. Each plant is free to reduce emissions in any way it 
chooses, whether by use of end-of-the-stack scrubbers, or low-sulfur 
fuels, the development of new, lower-emission combustion technol-
ogies, or investment in conservation by its customers (and hence 
lower electricity demand and generation). Utilities that reduce their 
emissions below the amount permitted by their allowances would be 
able to sell those "extra" allowances as "credits" to other utilities 
for whom purchasing allowances is cheaper than investing in emis-
sions reductions. Emissions reduction therefore would become a 
profit center for electric utility plants. Market forces would deter-
mine the relative degree of emissions control that each plant 
achieves, but total emissions ultimately would be reduced by fifty 
percent. In order to make the fifty-percent reduction permanent, 
new plants would have to buy allowances from existing sources. The 
government would playa "market maker" role, retaining a limited 
share of the total supply of allowances to ensure their availability 
for sale to individual new or expanding plants. 
The costs savings of this trading plan over a plan that does not 
employ trading are estimated at about $1 billion per year or higher. 
The trading plan also creates a strong financial incentive for utilities 
to engage in energy conservation and technological innovation, 
whereas a rule requiring utilities to adopt specific emissions control 
mechanisms such as scrubbers would discourage both of these. 
3. Examples of Programs Under Discussion 
a. Hazardous Wastes 
For several types of hazardous wastes, such as lead-acid batteries 
and solvents, it is important not only to reduce the total quantities 
generated but also to ensure that whatever is generated is carefully 
handled. Prohibiting landfill disposal of such substances or mandat-
ing disposal in certain designated sites can lead to illegal "midnight 
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dumping." An alternative, market-based option is the use of deposit-
refund systems to encourage waste minimization and proper dis-
posal. Such a system relies on retailers charging a deposit on the 
sale of the item; the deposit is refunded when the purchaser returns 
the item to the retailer or a treatment facility. A deposit-refund 
system gives purchasers an incentive to minimize the initial gener-
ation of waste and properly to treat and dispose of wastes that they 
do generate. The states of Maine and Rhode Island now operate 
deposit-refund systems for lead-acid batteries. 
b. Climate Change 
If nations or the international community decide to take action to 
address potential climate change, the use of market-based incentives 
could be extremely helpful in implementing policy. Numerous 
sources emit a multitude of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in every sector 
of the economy, including energy, agriculture, and transportation-
"sinks" such as forests and oceans absorb these gases. The widely 
varying costs of control across gases, sectors, and nations as well as 
the global dispersion of the emissions, make market mechanisms 
especially attractive in this context. 
Options for addressing GHG emissions include tradeable allow-
ances and fees. Either of these mechanisms could be employed do-
mestically or internationally, although the considerations may differ 
in each context. To the extent feasible, an allowance or fee should 
be comprehensive, including all GHGs (carbon dioxide, methane, 
nitrous oxide, CFCs, and hydrochlorofluorocarbons, and its precur-
sors) and all sinks or reservoirs of GHGs, such as forests. An index 
could be devised to express, in terms of carbon dioxide-equivalence, 
the relative contribution of each gas to global climate change. The 
tax or allowance could then be expressed in carbon dioxide-equiva-
lents, allowing nations or sources the flexibility to achieve require-
ments by reducing whatever GHG or expanding whatever sink was 
cheapest and most feasible for each nation or source. 
Under tradeable allowances, GHG emitters would receive allow-
ances and be free to trade them. Because the cost of limiting GHG 
emissions is likely to vary considerably among emitters, market-
based allocation of compliance burdens could achieve significant cost 
savings and promote innovation. Trading is a particularly appropri-
ate tool for addressing GHG emissions because, unlike toxic air and 
water pollutants, GHG emissions mix globally in the atmosphere. 
Moreover, the spatial distribution of their emissions sources is es-
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sentially irrelevant-they do not pose the problem of local toxic 
"hotspots" that some pollutants do. 
International trading could begin informally as cooperative ar-
rangements among nations. For example, one nation could provide 
another nation with technology and investment to reduce emissions, 
or with assistance in reforestation, and receive in return a part of 
the resultant GHG reduction as a credit against its own emission 
reduction obligations. Regional or group "bubbles" could be autho-
rized to foster regional trading. Ultimately, an international market 
in allowances traded among private actors could develop. Either 
formal or formalized trading would facilitate the transfer of resources 
and technology, on a decentralized market basis, to developing na-
tions and the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations to assist 
them toward a low-GHG pattern of economic development. 
IV. MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES IN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 
It is especially appropriate for the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe to consider starting now with a market-based approach to 
environmental law. Market-based environmental policies are most 
effective when a government employs them from the beginning, and 
function less smoothly when grafted onto a command-and-control 
base. For example, if the first round of policy requires installation 
of a specific technology, it is difficult to implement a second round 
of policy that allows firms the flexibility to choose control strategies 
as though the technology rule has not been imposed. In addition, 
the cost savings from the market-based policy will not be as large 
once the technology rule is already in place. 
Although environmental law in the United States started with 
centrally planned, command-and-control measures and only later 
began to employ market-based incentives, other nations need not 
repeat this history. They can adopt market-based incentive ap-
proaches for environmental protection from the outset. The Soviet 
Union and the nations of Eastern Europe have a unique opportunity 
to build sound markets for their economies and adopt sound market-
based environmental policies at the same time. 
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